Carl F. W. Borgward G. M. B. H. v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
10-24-1958
Carl F. W. Borgward G. M. B. H. v. Superior Court
In and For Los Angeles County
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Carl F. W. Borgward G. M. B. H. v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County 51 Cal.2d 72 (1958).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/346
[L. A. No. 25060. In Bank. Oct. 24,1958.] 
CARL F. W. BORGWARD, G.Y.B.H. (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY, Respondent; A. W. WOOLVERTON et al., 
Real Parties in Interest. 
[1] Corporations-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process 
on foreign corporations that are doing business in this state, 
"doing business" is a descriptive term that the courts have 
equated with such minimum contacts with the state that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
[2] Id. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business.-"Doing busi-
ness" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411, is synon-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq. 
iricK. Dig. References: [1-7] Corporations, § 898; [8] Corpo-
rations, § 899. 
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ymous with the power of the st,ate to subject foreign eor-
porations to loeal process. 
[8] Id. - Foreigu Corpofll.tiono Dom, Dusincli8. - The words 
"transad intrastate business," LIS defined in Corp. Code, § 6203, 
are not the equivalent of "doing business in this State," as 
used in Code Civ. Proe., § 411, subd. 2. 
[4] ld. - Foreign Corporations - Doing Business. - Corp. Code. 
§ 6203, by excluding acts done by a foreign corporation in this 
state in interstate or foreign commerce from its definition of 
"transact intrastate business," clearly recogniled that a ,e6r-
poration may do business in this state without transacting 
intrastate business. 
[5] ld. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business. - Corp. Code, 
§ 6300, declaring that "this part (part 11, relating to foreign 
corporations) does not apply to corporations engaged solely 
in interstate or foreign commerce," affords no basis for de-
parting from the well established meaning of "doing business 
in this State/' as used in Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, since 
the service provisions of part 11 (Corp. Code, §§ 6500-6504) 
are applieable to such foreign corporations, not 6a: proprio 
'Vigore, but because they are incorporated by reference in Code 
Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2. 
[6] ld.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Part 11 of the 
Corporations Code, in addition to the service provisions 
(§§ 6500-6504), eontains detailed regulatory and penal provi-
sions governing foreign corporations engaged in the transac-
tion of intrastate business, and the legislative history of § 6300 
makes clear that it was these latter provisions, not Code Civ. 
Proe., § 411, subd. 2, that are gov:erned by it. 
[7] ld. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business.-Former 'Civ. 
Code, § 407 (now substantially Corp. Code, § 6300), referred 
only to the acts required to qualify to conduct intrastate busi-
ness and made clear thnt foreign corporations engaged solely 
in interstate or foreign commerce were not required so to qual-
ify, but in no way indicated that such corporations doing 
business in this state were not subject to service here. 
[8] ld.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-A German cor-
poration whose products were not only sold in this state 
through an independent importer who purchased and took title 
to its products in Germany, but which actively undertook to 
promote and protect its market in California by sending its 
agent to negotiate contracts here and who has performed such 
important services for such corporation here, namely, the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a satisfactory importing, distrib-
uting and sales organization, as to constitute such agent the 
corporation's "general manager in this State" (Corp. Code, 
.. _J 
74 CARL F. W. BORGWARD, G.M.B.H. v. [51 C.211 
SUPEBIOB COURT 
§ 6500) for purposes of service of process, and process 'Was 
properly served. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court I 
of Los Angeles County to enter an order quashing service of 
summons upon petitioner. Writ denied. 
Overton, Lyman & Prince, Eugene Overton and Ernest E. 
Johnson for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E. 
Lamoreaux, Assistant County CounsE'l, for Respondent. 
Macbeth & Ford and Moira Ford for Real Parties in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, Carl F. W. Borgward G. M. 
B. H., a German corporation, seeks a writ of mandate to 
compel the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to enter 
its order quashing service of summons in an action brought by 
plaintiffs, the real parties in interest in this proceeding. (See 
Code Civ. Proc. § 416.3.) Earle C. Anthony, Inc., and Doe 
One to Doe Ten were joined as defendants in plaintiffs' 
action. Borgward was served by makiligpersonal service on 
Lutz Knemeyer in California as its alleged "general manager 
in this State." (Corp. Code, § 6500.) It appeared specially 
and moved to quash the service of summons. Its motion was 
denied. 
At the time they filed their action, plaintiffs were dis-
tributors and dealers selling Borgward automobiles and pa 
pursuant to a contract with Anthony, the exclusive importe 
of Borgward's products for the western United States. An 
thony had announced its intention not to renew plaintiffs 
contract at the end of its term on December 31, 1957. Plain 
tiffs alleged that Anthony had agreed that the contract woul 
be renewed unless plaintiffs gave Anthony good cause fo I 
refusing to do so, but that the contract failed to express thi~ 
agreement. They also alleged an oral contract with Borgwal'~ 
whereby plaintiffs agreed to enter into a franclliRe agreemE'llf 
with Anthony for distributing Borgward products and B01'g! 
ward agreed that plaintiffs' franchise to market such product~; 
in the territory already developed in Southern Californi 
would not be terminated so long as plaintiffs performed thei 
duties diligently and efficiently, and that Anthony's contrac' 
with Borgward was subject to this oral agreement . 
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Plaintiffs also alleged that Anthony and Doe One to Doe Ten 
{'ntf'rl'n 8 (>onspira(>y to interfere with their oral contract with 
Borgward for the purpose of appropriating plaintiffs' busi-
ness for themselves. 
Plaintiffs prayed for reformation of their contract with 
Anthony and a declaration of their rights thereunder; for a 
declaration of the existence and terms of their oral agreement 
with Borgward; for injunctive relief against Anthony and 
Borgward to secure plaintiffs' rights under their contracts; 
and for compensatory and exemplary damages against An-
thony and Doe One to Doe Ten. 
Borgward contends that it was not and is not doing business 
in this state within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure, 
!'ection 411, subdivision 2, and is therefore not subject to 
service of process pursuant to Corporations Code, section 6500. 
[1] In Henry R. John & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 
2d 855, 858-859 [323 P.2d 437], we stated: "The statute 
authorizes service of process on foreign corporations that are 
'doing business in this State.' That term is a descriptive one 
that the courts have equated with such minimum contacts with 
the state 'that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" (In-
tenwHono.l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Whatever limi-
tntion it imposes is equivalent to that of the due process clause. 
[2] ." [D]oing business" within the meaning of section 411 
of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the power 
of the state to subject foreign corporations to local proc-
ess.' (Eclipse FtleZ etc. Co. v. S1(.perior Court, 148 Cal.App. 
2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] .... )" 
It is contended at the outset that we should reexamine the 
rule of the Jahn case in the light of Corporations Code, 
sr('tions 6203 and 6300. Code of Civil Procedure section 411, 
suhdivision 2, provides for service of process on foreign cor-
]10ration8 "doing business in this State; in the manner pro-
vided by Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations 
Code." Those sections and sections 6203 and 6300 are all in 
part 11 of the Corporations Code. Section 6300 provides that 
., this part does not apply to corporations engagf'd solely 
in intrrs!atf' or fOl'('ign eOll1mercr," awl I;('('! ion 620~ provi(l<,s 
1llat ""l'rallsad intl'astat(> IJllsilll'ss' Dlrllll.-'; I'llfprilig into 
J'\'p<,ated and sueeessive transactions of its busilless in tIlis 
Stair, other than intl'rstate or foreign commerce." Accord-
) 
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ingly, it is contended that no provision has been made for 
service on corporations engaged solely in interstate or foreign 
commerce and that "doing business in this State" wllhill 
the meaning of section 411 must mean transacting intrastate 
business as defined in section 6203. 
There is no merit in this contention. [3] Section 6203 
defines, not the words "doing business in this State," but 
the words "transact intrastate business." Since the Legisla-
ture was dealing specifically with the definition of terms, had 
it meant the two phrases to be equivalent, it would have said 
so. [4] Moreover, by excluding acts done by a foreign 
corporation in this state in interstate or foreign commerce 
from its definition of the words "transact intrastate business," 
it clearly recognized that a corporation may do business in 
this state without transacting intrastate business. 
[6] Nor does section 6300 afford any basis for departing 
from the well established meaning of "doing business in this 
State," which was followed and applied in the Jahn case. 
It is true that if the service provisions of part 11 of the 
Corporations Code stood alone, section 6300 ,vould prevent 
their application to corporations engaged solely in interstate 
or foreign commerce. Those provisions are applicable to such 
corporations, however, not ex proprio vigore, but because they 
are incorporated by reference in section 411, subdivision 2 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. To hold that section 6300 
governs section 411, subdivision 2, would require amending it 
to read "This part and section 411, subdivision 2 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure do not apply to corporations engaged solely 
in interstate or foreign commerce." 
[6] In addition to the service provisions, part 11 of the 
Corporations Code contains detailed regulatory and penal pro-
visions governing foreign corporations engaged in the trans-
action of intrastate business, and the legislative history of 
section 6300 makes clear that it was these latter provisions, not 
section 411, subdivision 2, that are governed by it. [7] Sec-
tion 6300 was based on former Civil Code, section 407, which 
provided that "The requirements of this chapter [now part 
11 of the Corporations Code] as to foreign corporations shall 
not apply to corporations engaged solely in interstate or 
foreign commerce." (Italics added.) Section 407 thus re-
ferred only to the acts required to qualify to conduct intra-
state business and made clear that foreign corporations en-
gaged solely in interstate or foreign commerce were not 
required so to qualify. It is no way indicated, however, that 
) 
) 
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such corporations doing business in this state were not subject 
to service of process here. Given this court's recognition in 
1942 that a fOTficn ~oTpoTat.ion fngRg'f'il lIolfly in intfTlltl\tf' 
commerce may be amenable to suit here (West Publishing 00. 
v. Superior Oourt, 20 Ca1.2d 720, 729-731 [128 P.2d 777]), 
and the legislative declaration when the Corporations Code 
was enacted in 1947 that the" provisions of this code, insofar 
as they are substantially the same as existing statutory provi-
sions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed 
as restatements and continuations, and not as new enact-
ments" (Corp. Code, § 2), the recasting of the wording of 
section 407 of the Civil Code in section 6300 of the Corpo-
rations Code cannot be interpreted as intended to effect a 
radical change in the jurisdiction provided over foreign cor-
porations by section 411, subdivision 2 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
[8] Borgward contends, however, that even under the 
tests enunciated in the J ahn case and the cases there cited, 
it is not doing business in this state. Although it appears that 
several million dollars worth of its products are sold in this 
state annually, Borgward contends that such business is solely 
that of its independent importer Anthony, who purchases 
and takes title to its products in Germany. (See Irvine 00. v. 
McOolgan, 26 Ca1.2d 160, 165-166 [157 P.2d 847, 167 A.L.R. 
934].) Plaintiffs do not seek to found jurisdiction on the fact 
alone, however, that Borgward's products are sold in this state 
through Anthony, but on that fact coupled with the acts donc 
in this state by Borgward's agent Knemeyer in negotiating 
and arranging for the distribution of Borgward products by 
independent contractors, and they point out that their alleged 
cause of action is directly related to Knemeyer's activities 
here. 
Knemeyer visited California for periods of several days on 
three occasions in 1956 and 1957. In February 1956, with 
the approval of Borgward, he executed a contract in the 
form of a letter from Thomson to Borgward in Los Angeles 
appointing Walter J. Thomson CompanY,Ltd., as exclusive 
importer. It described Knemeyer's activities as follows: 
"1. The territory which you originally granted to us as 
sole importers had been broadened by Mr. Knemeyer to include 
all of the trading area territory lying west of the Mississippi 
River. 
"2. Mr. Knemeyer has removed Bob Knapp as distributor 
\ } 
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for California and has approved the appointment of Bob 
Knapp as exclusive dealer for the City of Pasadena .... 
"3. Mr. Knemeyer has approved the appointment of 
Messrs. Ed. Van Horn and Gordon Reid (who are forming a 
new corporation) as distributors for Northern California, 
Oregon, Washington, Idaho and the northern part of Ne-
vada .... 
"4. Mr. Knemeyer has approved appointment of Mr. Whit-
ney Lyon as distributor for all of the remaining territory not 
specifically mentioned in paragraph 3 above .... " 
Approximately a year later, after a dispute had arisen 
between Thomson and some of its distributors including plain-
tiffs, Knemeyer returned to California and with Borgward's 
approval, terminated Thompson as importer, and appointed 
Anthony. At that time Knemeyer met with plaintiffs and 
other distributors and according to plaintiffs made the oral 
agreement that is the subject of their action against Borgward. 
After Anthony informed plaintiffs that their contract would 
not be renewed, plaintiffs wrote Borgward and received a 
cable in reply stating that the matter was being referred to 
Knemeyer, then enroute to the United States and Canada, 
who would get in touch with plaintiffs in California. Process 
was served on Knemeyer shortly after he arrived in California 
on this trip. 
Disregarding the numerous affidavits setting forth extraju-
dicial statements of Knemeyer to California distributors and 
dealers that he had full authority to act for Borgward with 
respect to the importation, distribution, and sales of its prod-
ucts in California (see Hilyar V. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30, 
42 [286 P.2d 21]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 5), we 
conclude from the foregoing evidence that Knemeyer per-
formed important services for Borgward in California, name-
ly, the establishment and maintenance of a satisfactory im-
porting, distributing, and sales organization. Regardless of 
how closely these activities may have been supervised from 
Germany, they nevertheless were activities of Borgward 
through its agent here, and were sufficient to constitutt' 
Knemeyer Borgward's "general manager in this State" 
(Corp. Code, § 6500) for purposes of service of process if 
Borgward was doing business here. (Chas. Ehrlich &; CO. V. J. 
Elli.s Slater Co., 183 Cal. 709, 713 [192 P. 526] ; Eel'ipse Fuel 
etc. CO. V. SupcriOl' Court, 148 Ca1.App.2d 736, 743-746 [307 
P.2d 739] ; Milbank v. StancWl'd Motor Canst. Co., ]32 Cal. 
App. 67, 71 [22 P.2d 271].) 
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It thus appears that Borgward is not merely a manufac-
1urrr who ~cJJs its products in Germany knowin,:r 1111'.'- will 
rpaeh this siair. It has actively undertaken 10 prolllo!.' and 
protect its market in Califoruia by sending Its agcllt to lJego-
tiate contracts here. It reaps the benefit of the 10.·a1 market 
alld has access to our courts to enforce any rights growing 
out of its transactions here. Plaintiffs' alleged cause of 
action grew directly out of their relationship with Borgward's 
agent here and Borgward's dealings with its local importer 
Anthony. Plaintiffs are not seeking needlessly to inject Borg-
ward into a controversy concerning only them and Anthony. 
If plaintiffs are able to prove the existence of their contract 
with Borgward and its breach, they may nevertheless fail to 
prove that it is binding on Anthony or to establish any cause 
of action against Anthony. Obviously, however, it is prefer-
able, if possible, to settle the entire controversy in one action, 
here or in Germany. Even if it is assumed that plaintiffs 
could secure jurisdiction over Anthony in a German court, 
since all of the relevant events occurred in California the 
burden on plaintiffs and Anthony of prosecuting and defend-
ing in Germany would far outweigh the burden on Borgward 
of defending here. 
No point would be served by reiterating here the review of 
the recent authorities sustaining jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations set forth in the J ahn case. For the reasons 
stated above, however, and in the light of those authorities, 
we conclude that "the quality and nature of [its] activity in 
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws" 
fully justifies subjecting Borgward to the jurisdiction of our 
courts. (IlIicr'llatiollal Shoe 00. v_ Washingtoll, 326 U.S. 
310,319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., C,:,rter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would grant the writ for the 
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Vallee in the opinion pre-
pared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Borgward v. 
S1lperior Court (Ca1.App.), 325 P.2d 137. 
Petitioller's applieatioll for a rellt'ariug was denied No-
Yt'1II1wr 19, 1958. Se1la11er, .J., and M"Comb, J., were of HIe 
opinion that the applieatioll should be granted. 
